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INTRODUCTION
The world has increasingly become a global marketplace. A
product may have components manufactured in countries A, B, and
C; assembled in country D; and offered for sale in country E.
Furthermore, the use of that product may take place in country F or G.
In this global marketplace, how is patent infringement determined?
Traditionally, under United States law, patents have been given only
territorial application. 1 Thus, a competitor of a patented product can
avoid an infringement suit by merely stepping outside of the country
for one element of the process while still deriving most of his
economic benefit within the United States. This narrow definition of
patent infringement works poorly in a world with a global
marketplace. Change is necessary.
The current trend is to analyze extraterritorial use under 35
U.S.C. § 271 sections (f) and (g), the sections of the Patent Act that
grant specific and limited extraterritorial protection. However, as can
be seen in the recent cases of Eolas Tech. Inc., v. Microsoft Corp. and
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., both of which analyzed
extraterritorial use under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), it is easy for the courts
to follow the letter of the statute but miss the purpose of patent
protection in the United States.2 I argue that courts should stop the
current trend and instead look to the precedent of the 2004 case of
t The author is a student at Santa Clara University School of Law, Editor-in-Chief of
the Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal, and a J.D. candidate for 2006,
having received her B.S. from Purdue University in 2001. She would like to thank Professor
Donald S. Chisum for his direction on this article, as well as her husband, Brian, and her father,
Robert, for their help and support.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1) (2000).
2. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Tech. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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NTP, Inc., v. Research In Motion, Ltd. when interpreting infringement
under the general infringement provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a).3
This paper argues that United States patent infringement cases
should be analyzed based on factors that determine the economic
impact on the United States market rather than based on the statutory
technicalities of where each element is made, used, or sold. These
factors that I refer to as "territorial impact factors" are: (1) control (2)
beneficial use, and (3) ownership. 4 Using these factors, courts can
determine whether the impact from the potential infringement takes
place primarily within the United States and thus affects the patent
owner's exclusive patent rights, or primarily outside of the United
States and thus does not affect those exclusive rights.
Part I gives a historical perspective of the United States' position
on the extraterritorial impact of patent law. It discusses the
presumption that a patent applies only within the territorial
boundaries of the United States. 5 It then looks at several historic cases
that have dealt with this presumption and analyzes how these cases
would have been decided using the territorial impact factors. 6
Part II discusses Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc v. Laitram Corp.
and the statutory changes in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and § 271(g) enacted
in reaction to the Court's decision in Deepsouth.7 It also discusses the
current inconsistencies presented in cases that have attempted to
define these new statutory sections. 8
Part III discusses two subsequent cases, Decca Limited. v. The
United States and NTP, Inc., v. Research In Motion, Ltd., which
defined and refined the concept of "territorial impact factors,"
although not specifically referring to them by that name.9
Finally, Part IV discusses the benefits of using territorial impact
factors as an interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), and why they are a
better way to deal with extraterritorial issues than sections 271 (f) and
3. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
4. Id. at 1370; Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (1976); NTP, Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15804, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1763 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
5. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
6. Dowagiac Mfg. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915); Boesch v. Graff,
133 U.S. 697 (1890); John Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
7. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
8. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); W.R. Grace
& Co. - Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (1999).
9. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1083; NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
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(g). Then it analyzes how Eolas Tech. Inc., v. Microsoft Corp. and
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. should have been decided using the
territorial impact factors rather than 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).10
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY
This section looks at the statutory rule governing patent
infringement, the general rules behind construing statutes against
finding an extraterritorial effect, and the famous cases dealing with
this issue.
A. General Statutory Rule and Its Interpretation
The basis for the United States patent system is Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the authority
to enact legislation "to promote the progress of ... useful arts, by
securing for limited times to ... inventors the exclusive right to
their... discoveries."' 1I The statutory core of the current patent
regime is derived from the Patent Act of 1952, which is found in 35
U.S.C. sections 1 - 376.12 The definition of infringement is found at
35 U.S.C. 271(a) - (i).
Section 271(a) of the United States Patent Act states that
"whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore,
infringes the patent." 13 Therefore, by the very nature of the statute on
its face, general infringement under section 271(a) is limited to
actions that take place either "within" or "into" the United States.
The Supreme Court has stated that, generally, the courts of the
United States should presume "that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
boundaries of the United States." 14 This general presumption can be
overcome when a party claiming extraterritorial application shows
"the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." 15 Thus,
the statute covering general patent infringement, as it does not appear
10. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Tech. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
12. The Patent Act of 1952 is the most recent Act, although it has been amended on
several occasions. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000) for the entire 1952 Patent Act.
13. 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (emphasis added).
14. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
15. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
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to show a contrary congressional intent, but rather discusses actions
happening "within" or "into" the United States, has been interpreted
to only apply to the United States and its territories. 16
However, the territorial presumption is merely a canon of
statutory construction, and it is generally accepted that Congress does
have the power to legislate extraterritorially if it so chooses. 17
Sections 35 U.S.C. § 217(f) and (g) deal with infringement by
exportation and importation of certain types of goods into and out of
the United States. These subsections exemplify a showing of
congressional intent to apply patent law outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States. For example, in section 271(f)
Congress has expanded patent infringement to include the exportation
of all or substantial portions of the patented invention. 18 It states,
"whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention.., shall be liable as an infringer."'19 Likewise,
in section 271(g), Congress has made a limited exception for the
importation of a product made by a process patented in the United
States, unless certain limitations are found.20 Section 271(g) states
"whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to
sell, sells, or uses within the Unites States a product which is made by
a process patented in the Unites States shall be liable as an
infringer...",21 The exceptions include importation after the product
was materially changed by subsequent processes, 22 or when the
imported product becomes a trivial and nonessential component of
another product. 23
B. Historic Cases
The Supreme Court, even when interpreting the reach of general
patent infringement under section 271(a), has sometimes looked
beyond the general presumption of territoriality to a broader goal of
patent protection. 24 It has interpreted some actions that technically fall
16. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
17. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 284.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 (2000).
19. § 271(0(1) (emphasis added).
20. § 27 1(g).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. § 271(g)(1).
23. § 271(g)(2).
24. Dowagiac Mfg. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915); Boesch v.
Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890); John Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 198 (1856).
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under the statute as non-infringements when the connection to the
United States is weak.25 The Supreme Court has also held some
actions to be infringements when their actions have a strong economic
impact on the patented invention within the United States. 26
The cases below show how the Supreme Court has dealt with
issues of patent infringement when an extraterritorial issue arises. 27
The reasoning and results of these three cases is in agreement with the
territorial impact factor test. If these factors had been used, the result
of these cases would not have changed. Thus, these seminal cases
support the territorial impact factor test.
i. Brown v. Duchesne
The case of John Brown v. Duchesne was decided in 1856.28
Although territorial language did not appear explicitly in the patent
statute until the Patent Act of 1870,29 the Brown court assumed that
patent protection was territorial.30 However, the Brown case did not
stick to a literal interpretation of infringement. 31 The Brown court
created a policy based exception for excusing an infringing act that
did not have an economic impact on the United States market, even
when the act was technically done "within the United States."32
The plaintiff in Brown, patented an improved "gaff' used on
boats.33 The alleged infringer was a French vessel, which contained
such a "gaff."'34 The vessel was temporarily located in the Boston
Harbor. 35 This was technically "use" within the territory of the United
States because the vessel was in U.S waters. 36  The court
acknowledged that the words of the patent statute "taken by
themselves, and literally construed, without regard to the object in
view, would seem to sanction the claim of the plaintiff. '37 However,
25. Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 650; Brown, 60 U.S. at 198.
26. Boesch, 133 U.S. at 703.
27. Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 650; Boesch, 133 U.S. at 703; Brown, 60 U.S. at 198.
28. John Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
29. The 1870 Act provided that the issuance of a patent granted the patent holder
exclusive rights "throughout the United States and the Territories thereof...." [Patent] Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870).
30. Brown, 60 U.S. at 195.
31. Id. at 194.
32. See generally Brown, 60 U.S. 183.
33. Id. at 193.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 194.
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the court stated that patent laws "do not, and were not intended to,
operate beyond the limits of the United States."'38 Therefore, the
court found no infringement. 39
Applying the territorial impact factors to Brown would result in
the same conclusion. Because the operation of the French vessel was
almost exclusively outside of the territory of the United States, no
infringement was found.40 The "gaff' was owned by the French
vessel, it was operated on the French vessel, and the economic benefit
derived from this use was for the French owners and operators.
Although the "gaff' was temporarily within United States waters, the
territorial impact factors show that there was no detrimental effect on
the exclusive rights of the United States patent owner. Therefore, the
territorial impact factors, like the court's decision in Brown, would
find no infringement for the use of the "gaff' in this context.
ii. Boesch v. Graff
The case of Boesch v Graff was decided in 1890, when the
Patent Act of 1870 was in effect.4 1 Therefore, by this time,
extraterritorial restrictions were statutory as well as a rule of case
law. 42 Boesch, unlike Brown, dealt with an item that, although it was
manufactured outside of the United States, was sold within the United
States. Because of this difference, the court came to the opposite
conclusion, ruling that there was enough action within the United
States to qualify as an infringement. 43
The issue in Boesch derived from the fact that the defendant
received goods from a third party manufacturer in Germany.44 Under
German law, the manufacturer of the patented product, a type of lamp
burner, was allowed to make and sell the products because German
law recognized a "prior user right."'45 A prior user right is one in
which a user who has begun commercializing a product before an
inventor files an application covering that product may continue to
38. Id. at 195.
39. Id. at 199.
40. Id. at 189-99.
41. Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
42. [Patent] Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870).
43. Boesch, 133 U.S. at 703.
44. Id. at 702.
45. Id. at 703.
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commercialize that product even after the patent issues.46 The
defendant argued that since the third party manufacturer did not
infringe by making the lamp burners in Germany the defendant
should not be liable for infringement by selling them in the United
States.47 This argument was rejected. The court stated that
infringement occurs under US law when a sale is commenced
"without the license or consent of the owners" and that the German
prior user right could not provide a form of involuntary authority. 48
The court stated, "[t]he sale of articles in the United States under a
United States patent cannot be controlled by foreign laws."'4 9
A similar result occurs when the facts of Boesch are analyzed
under the territorial impact factors. Although the lamp burner was
manufactured in Germany, the overall impact of the sale of the burner
took place in the United States.50 A United States consumer owned
the product, the benefit of the lamp burner to the consumer took place
in the United States, and the control of the lamp remained with the
consumer who lived in the United States.51 Therefore, no matter what
protection prior user rights give to actions taking place in Germany,
once the product is sold in America the detrimental effect is directly
felt by the United States patent owner, and thus infringement has
occurred.
iii. Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota
Manufacturing Plow Co.
Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Manufacturing Plow
Co. was decided in 1915.52 In this case, the issue revolved around
sales that took place outside of the United States.53 The court
construed the infringement statute literally and concluded that sales
outside of the United States could not be an infringement of a United
States patent. 54
46. Donald S. Chisum, Extraterritorial application of U.S. Intellectual Property Law:
Comment: Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent
Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 606 (1997).
47. Boesch, 133 U.S. at 699.
48. Id. at 702-03.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 704.
51. Id. at 702.
52. Dowagiac Mfg. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915).
53. Id. at 650.
54. Id.
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Dowagiac involved sales of a patented improvement in grain
drills. 55 The defendants purchased drills from a third party and sold
some of them in the United States and to consumers in Canada. 56 The
issue as to the infringement of the third party manufacturers and the
sales in the United States was easily settled as direct infringement.57
However, the issue as to whether the drills sold in Canada should also
be considered an infringement was more difficult. The court
determined that because these sales took place outside of the United
States, they were beyond the territorial reach of United States patent
law.58 The court stated, "[t]he right conferred by a patent under our
law is conferred to the United States and its territories and
infringement of this right cannot be predicated on acts wholly done in
a foreign country."'59
The same result would occur if the territorial impact factors were
used to decide infringement in Dowagiac, in the same fashion that
infringement was found in Boesch. The sale took place in Canada and
the economic impact of its subsequent use would also be in Canada,
not the United States. A Canadian consumer owned the drill, the
benefit of the drill to the consumer took place in Canada, and the
control of the drill remained with the consumer who lived in Canada.
Therefore, no detrimental effect was felt by the United States patent
owner because of the sale of the drill in Canada.
These three cases show that throughout the history of the
Supreme Court's assessment of direct infringement involving
extraterritorial issues, a consistent pattern has arisen. This pattern is in
agreement with the analysis used under the territorial impact factors
test.
II. CHANGES IN THE RULE
"In 1972 the Supreme Court faced a case that laid bare the full
ramifications of the barriers that had been erected against
extraterritorial applications of U.S. patent laws."'60 Deepsouth
Packing Co., Inc, v Laitram Corp. had a major effect on United States
infringement analysis by motivating a Congressional amendment to
55. Id. at 643.
56. Id. at 650.
57. Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 643.
58. Id. at 650.
59. Id.
60. Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported
Software: 35 U.S.C. §271), 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L. 557, 561 (2004).
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the patent law. 61 The result in Deepsouth lead Congress to enact 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) in 1984, in order to "close a loophole in the patent
law" pointed out by Deepsouth.62 In 1988, another statute, 271(g),
was passed to further protect U.S. patents from actions abroad. 63
These statutory changes have lead to debate as to whether an
infringing "product" must be tangible or not. Current case law defines
a § 271(f) "product" as intangible but requires tangibility for a
"component" under § 271(g), which puts the current infringement
subsections illogically at odds with each other.64
A. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc, v Laitram Corp
The plaintiff in Deepsouth received a patent for a shrimp-
deveining machine wherein the improvement over previous machines
was a combination of a shrimp "slitter" and a shrimp "tumbler. '65 The
defendant manufactured all of the elements of the deveining
combination patent, but then shipped the deveining equipment to
foreign customers in three separate boxes.66 The issue therefore was
whether the defendant "made" the patented invention when the final
step of assembly took place outside of the United States.67 The court
concluded that it did not.68 The court stated that a combination patent,
such as the one at issue in Deepsouth, "protects only against the
whole and not the manufacture of its parts."'69 The court went on to
say that there must be a "clear congressional indication of intent to
extend the patent privilege" before this action would be considered an
infringement. 70
B. Statutory Changes 35 U.S.C § 271(f) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)
Congress saw the holding in Deepsouth as a loophole in the
patent laws. 71 In response, Congress added subsection (f) of section
61. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
62. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 3383) 5827, 5828 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 271(f) (2000)).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
64. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1368 (2003); W.R. Grace & Co. -
Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (1999).
65. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 520.
66. Id. at 524.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 532.
69. Id. at 528.
70. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532.
71. Fisch, supra note 60, at 565.
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271 as "a legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law."' 72
Section 271(f) provides, "whoever without authority supplies or
causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention.., shall be liable
as an infringer. '73 According to legislative history, Congress intended
subsection (f) to "prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by
supplying components of a patented product in this country so that the
assembly of the components may be completed abroad. '74 The
addition of subsection (f) was a major change in the definition of
infringement under U.S. patent law as it more specifically addressed
actions taken outside of the United States. 75 However, even with this
change, Congress "relied on some domestic act as a hook to reach
foreign-based economic activity that harms a patent owner's interest
in deriving full economic benefit from the U.S market for the patented
invention." 76
Another extension of the patent law, although not a direct
reaction to Deepsouth, came in 1988 under the Process Patent
Amendments Act.77 Under this act, 271 (g) was added. Subsection (g)
provides, "whoever without authority imports into the United States
or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the Unites States a product which
is made by a process patented in the Unites States shall be liable as an
infringer.. .78 In this subsection, the focus is even more on foreign
activity, as it concentrates on products made abroad by a process
which is patented in the United States.79 However, technically section
2 71(g), like section 271(f), has no extraterritorial effect because the
infringement arises only once the product has been imported into the
United States.80
C. The "tangible" debate
Case law has understood "product" differently for subsection (f)
and subsection (g). It has determined that a "product" under
72. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 3383) 5827, 5828 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 271(0 (2000)).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)(2000).
74. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 3383) 5827, 5828 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 271(f) (2000)).
75. Id. at 5827.
76. Chisum, supra note 46, at 607.
77. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 9003, 102 Stat. 1563 (1988).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
79. Id.
80. Chisum, supra note 46, at 607.
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subsection (f) does not have to be tangible.81 It could, for example, be
computer software. 82 However, under subsection (g) case law has
determined that a "product" needs to be tangible.83 For example, a lab
result does not qualify. 84 The two subsections show no inherent intent
for a product to have two different definitions, so the current lack of
uniformity is puzzling.
i. W.R. Grace & Co. - Conn. v. Intercat, Inc. and 271(f)
In W.R. Grace & Co. - Conn., v. Intercat, Inc., the issue
revolved around a patented chemical compound for reducing sulfur
emissions in oil refining processes. 85 The defendant argued that
section 271(f) did not apply to its international sales because the
legislative history "states that the statute only covers components of
machines and other structural combinations, since the section was
enacted specifically to overrule [Deepsouth].' '86 The court rejected
this argument, and stated, "[n]owhere in the statute or its legislative
history is there a limitation to components of machines and other
structural combinations. '87 Thus, the court ruled that the defendant
could be held liable for foreign distribution of the chemicals under
271(f). 88 Cases following Grace expanded the definition of 271(f)
"products" to include software and other intangible products as
well. 89
ii. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and 271 (g)
The opposite result for the definition of "product" was reached in
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. by analyzing 271(g). 90
Housey owned several patents directed to a method of screening
substances for use as protein inhibitors. 91 Bayer performed this
method outside of the United States, imported the information into the
81. Eolas Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005); W.R. Grace &
Co. - Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (1999).
82. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1328.
83. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
84. Idat 1368
85. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
86. Id. at 320 (quoting Patent Law Amendments Act 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 3383), 5827, 5828 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
271(f)(2000))).
87. Id. at 321.
88. Id.
89. "Eolas Tech. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
90. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
91. Id. at 1368-69.
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U.S., and used it to develop drugs. 92 Bayer argued that section 271(g)
applied only to a method of manufacture and not to a method of use,
as was claimed by Housey, so its actions were not covered under
section 271(g). 93 The court looked extensively at the plain meaning,
dictionary definition, and legislative history in determining the
meaning of the terms of subsection (g) and determined that the
manufacture of a physical and tangible product was necessary for
infringement. 94 The court stated that in order for a product to be
"made by a process patented in the United States" it must have been a
physical article. 95 Therefore, it determined that the production of
information is not covered under section 271 (g). 9 6
Bayer and Grace show that the case law is in disagreement as to
whether a "product" must be tangible or not.97 The distinction is
confusing and a more general rule is needed. The need to parse the
definitions of section 271 (f) and 271 (g) could be eliminated or greatly
reduced by expanding the application of section 271(a) using the
territorial impact factors.
III. THE CREATION OF THE TERRITORIAL IMPACT FACTORS
The three territorial impact factors include: (1) control, (2)
beneficial use, and (3) ownership.98 They are used to determine where
the economic impact of potentially infringing activity takes place,
which determines whether a U.S. patent owner is deriving his full
economic benefit from the U.S. market.99 If the economic benefit
from the U.S. market of the patent owner is reduced by the potential
infringer's activities, then the territorial impact factors show that a
true infringement has taken place.
The territorial impact factors first appeared in the 1976 decision
of Decca Limited v. United States. 00 In Decca, they were applied in
conjunction with a straightforward claim interpretation, which made
them hardly necessary. However, in the 2003 decision of NTP Inc. v.
92. Id. at 1370.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1370-77.
95. Id. at 1377.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1368; W.R. Grace & Co. - Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321
(1999).
98. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (1976); NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
99. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1083; NTP, 392 F.3d at 1370.
100. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1070.
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Research In Motion, Ltd., the territorial impact factors played a
central role in the determination of infringement. 101 This paper
advocates the continued use of the territorial impact factors in future
extraterritorial infringement actions.
A. Decca Limited v. The United States - Introducing The
Territorial Impact Factors
Decca Limited v. The United States dealt with the issue of where
the "using" and "making" of a patented invention took place. 102 The
invention was to a worldwide broadcasting system used to pinpoint
ship and aircraft locations by use of a master station located in the
United States' several transmitter stations, one of which was located
in Norway. 103 Decca argued that the U.S. government infringed its
patent by operating this global positioning system. However, the
government argued, "a claim is infringed only when an operative
assembly of the entire claimed combination is made within the
territorial limits of the United States."' 104 The court disagreed. It
determined that although one of the elements necessary for the system
to work, the Norway transmitter station, was located outside of the
United States, other factors determined that the use was still
essentially within the United States. 105 The Decca court based its
conclusion on the territorial impact factors. 106 It stated:
This conclusion does not rest on any one factor but on the
combination of circumstances here present, with particular
emphasis on the ownership of the equipment by the United States,
the control of the equipment by the United States and on the actual
beneficial use of the system within the United States. 107
It must be noted however that the Decca court did not directly
apply the territorial impact factors that it created. It stated that the
specific claim at issue in its case was to the reception of the signals,
and not to the generation of the signals. 10 8 The reception took place
only in the United States, whereas the generation took place both
101. NTP, 392 F.3d. at 1370.
102. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1082.
103. Id. at 1074.
104. Id. at 1081.
105. Id. at 1082-83.
106. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1083.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
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inside and outside of the United States. 109 The Decca court stated
that, "had the invention dealt with generation of the signals
themselves, it seems clear that the utilization of those signals in this
country would.., have been beyond the reach of the U.S. patent
laws."1 0 This limitation to the specific claim interpretation may have
contributed to the extensive time between the Decca decision and the
next use of the territorial impact factors.
B. NTP Inc. v Research In Motion, Ltd. - Using The Territorial
Impact Factors
NTP Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd is the first case to
exclusively use the territorial impact factors in deciding whether an
infringement took place under section 271 (a).ll' For this reason, it is
a pivotal case in defining a new era of patent infringement analysis.
Cases in the future should look to NTP's use of the territorial impact
factors in determining infringement of U.S. patents.
NTP owned several patents to a remote electronic mail system
wherein an email message could be viewed on a remote receiver.1 12
Research In Motion (RIM) is a Canadian corporation that produces
the BlackBerry system for remote access of email.113 Under RIM's
system, a signal is sent from one hand held BlackBerry device to
another computer or BlackBerry device by connecting to a remote
"relay" system located in Canada. 14 RIM contended, "because the
BlackBerry 'relay' is located in Canada, as a matter of law RIM
cannot be held liable for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271.,115 The
court however, disagreed.
The NTP court stated, "section 271 (a) is only actionable against
patent infringement that occurs within the United States."" 16
However, the NTP court found that infringement had occurred by
using the territorial impact factors. 117 The court distinguished the
NTP case from the Deepsouth case by showing that the location of the
infringement in NTP took place in the United States, whereas the
location of the infringement in Deepsouth was outside of the United
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
112. Id. at 1341.
113. Id. at 1341-42.
114. Id. at 1342.
115. Id. at 1364.
116. NTP, 392 F.3d at 1366.
117. Id. at 1371.
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States.1 18 The court then proved this location using the territorial
impact factors from Decca. 119 The court stated:
Although RIM's Relay, which is located in Canada, is the only
component that satisfies the "interface" of the "interface switch"
limitation asserted in the claims, because all of the other
components of RIM's accused system are located in the United
States, and the control and beneficial use of RIM's system occurs
in the United States, we conclude that the sims of the "use" of
RIM's system for purposes of section 271(a) is the United
States. 120
The territorial impact factors were thus used to decide that
infringement had occurred.'21
IV. THE FUTURE OF TERRITORIAL IMPACT FACTORS
The groundbreaking analysis in NTP comes from its use of the
territorial impact factors to find infringement even when one of the
elements necessary for infringement did not occur in the United
States. 122 In this way, NTP is quite different from Decca, which
explicitly stated that the court would not have found infringement if
the claims had been directed to what was occurring abroad. 123 This
use of the territorial impact factors as a distinct and sufficient
showing of infringement is what future courts should follow in
analyzing infringing activity that has elements taking place both
inside and outside of the United States.
A. The Benefits of Using The Territorial Impact Factors
The territorial impact factors of (1) control (2) beneficial use and
(3) ownership look to the economic impact of a possible infringing
act rather than to parsing the terminology of the patent infringement
statute. 124 This results in a judicial balancing test that fulfills the
purpose of patent protection.
The idea that a U.S. patent should only cover actions that take
place "within" the United States is outdated. It is an inadequate guide
for legislation or judicial interpretation in a global economy. From the
118. Id. at 1369.
119. Id. at 1370.
120. NTP, 392 F.3d at 1370.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (1976).
124. Id. at 1083; NTP, 392 F.3d at 1370.
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extraction of "raw materials to the sale and use of a final consumer
product, [products] are distributed internationally in a myriad of
ways. ' 125 A patent's scope should instead match the function of the
"market of the territory of the country issuing the patent."' 126
Matching the function of the market is accomplished neatly by
applying the territorial impact factors.
B. Sections 27169 and 271(g) Are Too Narrow
The use of the territorial impact factors is preferable over the
creation of specific statutory protections for determining when an act
that takes place partially outside of the United States is an
infringement. Subsections (f) and (g) show Congress' recent
inclination to attempt to adequately protect inventions patented in the
United States from the harms of global trade. However, the method of
protection under these subsections is limited to certain types of
activities, such as exportation of "substantial portions" of a patented
product or the sale, offer for sale, or use of a product made from a
patented process once it has been imported into the United States. 127
Thus, under these limited exceptions, a use which takes place in more
than one country, even if mostly in the United States would not be
covered. In addition, although both subsection (f) and subsection (g)
speak of a "product," case law has interpreted the definition of
"product" differently under each subsection. 128 Thus, the application
of the infringement statute is not uniform. Rather than creating
specialized exceptions to the patent infringement definition courts
should use a broad test that focuses on helping the U.S. patent holder
derive full economic advantage of the U.S. market for his product.
Courts should follow NTP's use of the territorial impact factors in
determining infringement.
C. How Eolas Tech Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. andAT&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp. Would Have Been Decided Under The
Territorial Impact Factors
Eolas Tech. Inc., v. Microsoft Corp. and AT&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp. are examples of cases that were decided poorly
125. Chisum, supra note 46, at 608.
126. Id.
127. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0, § 271(g) (2000).
128. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000); W.R. Grace & Co. - Conn. v.
Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (1999); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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because they were based on applying the specific definition of 35
U.S.C. 271(f). 129 In Eolas, the plaintiff held a patent to an invention
that allowed users to use a web browser in a fully interactive
environment, and alleged that certain aspects of Microsoft's Internet
Explorer product incorporated its invention. 130 Microsoft exported a
limited number of "golden master disks" containing the Windows
operating system to manufacturers abroad who then replicated the
code onto hard drives for sale outside of the United States.13 1 The
Eolas court construed the issue to be whether software code made in
the United States and exported abroad was a "component of a
patented invention under section 271(f)."132 The court concluded that
the software code on a golden master disk was a component because
the language of 271(f) does not impose any requirement of
"tangibility." In addition, the court found that sound policy counsels
against varying the definition of "component" according to the
particular form of the part under consideration. 133
The AT&T case had almost identical facts, with Microsoft
supplying the "gold master disks" to foreign manufacturers.
134
Likewise, the AT&T decision followed the Eolas definition of a
"component."' 135 The Court further went on to rule that software
replicated abroad from a master version exported from the United
States with the intent that it be replicated is deemed to be "supplied"
from the United States for the purposes of section 271(f).136 The
Court stated, "Given the nature of the technology the 'supplying' of
software commonly involves generating a copy."'1 37
This analysis of the definition of 271(f) in Eolas and AT&T
follows previous case law decisions. 138 However, the result is that an
infringement of a U.S. patent was found in a situation where all of the
products using the potentially infringing code were for "sale outside
129. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Tech. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
130. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1328.
131. Id. at 1331 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 1338.
133. Id. at 1339-41.
134. AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1368.
135. Id. at 1369.
136. Id. at 1369-71.
137. Id. at 1370.
138. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Tech. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005); W.R. Grace & Co. - Conn. v. Intercat,
Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (1999).
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of the United States." 139 This result is an example of following the
letter of the statute and missing the purpose of patent protection in the
United States. United States patent protection should only extend to
the economic advantage from the U.S. market. 140 In Eolas and A T& T,
the U.S. market was not affected by the exportation of the golden
master disks. Infringement should have been found based on patents
filed in the countries where the hard drives were sold.
Had Eolas and AT&T been analyzed using the territorial impact
factors, the result would have been in keeping with protecting the
economic advantage from the U.S. market only. First, the ownership
of the hard drive containing the infringing code is "outside of the
United States.' 141 Second, control of the hard drive is only with the
consumer, who is located outside of the United States. Finally, the
beneficial use of the Windows operating system is also for the
consumer located outside of the United States. The territorial impact
factors all point to non-infringement. Non-infringement makes sense
when ownership, control, and beneficial use are outside of the United
States. The U.S. patent owner is not economically disadvantaged by
the consumer activities taking place wholly outside of the United
States. Therefore, the territorial impact factors follow the purpose of
patent protection in Eolas better than a strict interpretation of
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
CONCLUSION
In a world where products are often made and assembled in
different countries than where they are eventually sold and used, the
strict concept of territoriality of patents breaks down. Instead, a U.S.
patent's scope should protect the economic advantage in the U.S.
market. This type of protection focuses on the purpose of territorial
protection rather than strictly on language parsing of the Patent Act.
The best way to accomplish this analysis is by use of the territorial
impact factors of (1) control, (2) ownership, and (3) beneficial use of
the allegedly infringing product. 142
139. Eolas Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
140. Chisum, supra note 46, at 608.
141. Eolas,3991F.3dat 1331.
142. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1370 (2004); Decca Ltd. v.
United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (1976).
